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W
hen the Community Reinvestment Act 
(CRA) was enacted in 1977, low-income 
American communities, especially in 
cities, were suffering from disinvestment 
and a lack of credit availability. The CRA requires banks 
and thrifts operating in and near those communities to 
lend in them, consistent with safe and sound operations. 
Since 1977, the financial services system and financial 
needs of low- and moderate-income consumers have 
changed dramatically. At least until recently, when credit 
has tightened, we have become concerned not only 
about access to credit, but also about the quality of cred-
it. Moreover, consumers have greater need for quality, 
affordable transactional, saving, investment and insur-
ance products. The combination of the CRA’s flexible 
affirmative mandate and the public availability of CRA 
examinations has been extremely powerful. This article 
asserts that while the CRA itself needs updating, its basic 
elements can and should be extended to a broader array 
of consumer financial products and providers.
Thirty Years of the CRA
In 1977, concerned about the denial of credit to 
lower-income communities, both minority and white, 
Congress enacted the Community Reinvestment Act. 
Under the CRA, “regulated financial institutions have 
[a] continuing and affirmative obligation to help meet 
the credit needs of the local communities in which they 
are chartered.” The statute also requires that federal bank 
regulators both “assess the institution’s record of meeting 
the credit needs of its entire community, including low- 
and moderate-income (LMI) neighborhoods, consistent 
with safe and sound operation of such an institution” 
and that they “take such record into account in its evalu-
ation of an application for a deposit facility by such 
institution.”1 Bank regulators award institutions one of 
four ratings, from Outstanding to Substantial Noncom-
pliance, and they make the examination reports (called 
Public Evaluations) public.
In the 30 years since its enactment, the CRA has sub-
stantially changed how banks and thrifts view and serve 
low- and moderate-income communities and consumers. 
These communities have seen billions, perhaps trillions, 
of dollars of credit and investment flow to them as a 
result of the act, other collateral laws such as the Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA),2 various antidiscrimi-
nation statutes, and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac obli-
gations.3 Although those subject to the CRA once com-
plained bitterly about it, that time has largely passed.
In the same 30 years, the U.S. financial system has 
also seen major changes. Even prior to the 2008 finan-
cial crisis, the number of banks and thrifts had declined 
1   12 USC 2901.
2   12 USC 2801. HMDA was enacted in 1975 and requires virtually all institutions making residential mortgage loans to maintain records on ap-
plications, denials, income, race, gender, location, use, and since 2004 for certain loans, the price of individual loan transactions, and to report 





munity Reinvestment Act: Access to Capital in an Evolving Financial Services System” (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, March 2002), 
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precipitously. Those that remain are, in general, far larger 
and geographically disbursed, a trend that shows signs of 
accelerating, not slowing down. Moreover, both nonbank 
financial institutions (such as check cashers) and the 
capital markets now have far greater impact on the finan-
cial and economic lives of low- and moderate-income 
consumers and communities than they did in 1977. 
The Need for Greater Access in a New World of 
Financial Services
From a consumer perspective, the current market 
troubles have demonstrated that although access to 
credit is critical, so too is the need for credit that is high 
quality and fairly priced. In an economy that is moving 
away from cash and toward greater global connectivity, 
consumers need well designed and fairly priced transac-
tional services, including remittance services. The nearly 
nonexistent national savings rate coupled with the many 
families who have no or limited assets, also underscore 
the need for savings and investment opportunities that 
are easy to access and use.4
From a community perspective, both branch closures 
and the consolidation of the banking industry have re-
duced access to bank services and decision makers and 
to the talents and leadership of local bankers in meeting 
community economic development needs. At the same 
time, community-based organizations, including com-
munity development corporations, Community Devel-
opment Financial Institutions, loan funds, counseling 
agencies, advocates, and others, have expanded to serve 
these communities directly and to leverage the efforts of 
banks and thrifts operating under the CRA.
The bulk of discussion about the CRA is focused on 
community investment and on home mortgage lending. 
This is not surprising given that measurement of activity 
in these two areas is relatively straightforward (HMDA 
makes measuring residential lending particularly easy), 
and regulators and outside forces have kept up a steady 
stream of questions about “how much are you doing, 
where, and for whom?” Intermittently, critics have taken 
on the Service Test, which attempts to measure how well 
banks serve customers other than through loans, arguing 
that it is misguided or simply ineffective in either mea-
suring or encouraging banks and thrifts to provide qual-
ity financial services in lower-income communities.5 
This article, in contrast, asks whether the framework 
of the CRA—a relatively broad affirmative mandate to 
serve—can be the basis for substantially improving the 
financial services offered to consumers of all income 
levels, in all communities, but with a special focus on 
the needs of low- and moderate-income consumers. It 
considers the question with respect to both the banks 
and thrifts already covered by the CRA and the many 
other types of organizations that also provide financial 
services to consumers.
The Changing Face of Consumer  
Financial Services
Since the CRA was enacted, consumer financial 
services, particularly for those of modest incomes, have 
changed dramatically. Consumers have moved from an 
economy in which cash and, to a lesser extent, checks 
were the major way of transacting business, paying bills, 
and getting paid to one in which only one-fifth of retail 
transactions are made in cash, and check use is declining 
in favor of credit and debit cards and ACH transactions.6
 To purchase a large item in 1977, consumers sought 
a term loan from their bank, and for smaller transactions, 
they used independent consumer finance companies 
and retailers. Today, a bank term loan (other than for 
a car, boat, or house) is rare, the independent finance 
companies have largely been acquired by banks, and 
credit cards are ubiquitous. In 2004, approximately 
4   For information on low savings rates, see Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Personal Savings Rate (online chart, 
2008),	available	at	http://www.bea.gov/briefrm/saving.htm.	The	savings	rate	has	been	below	one	percent	since	2005,	although	for	the	second	




5   See, e.g., Kelly Cochran, Michael Stegman, and Robert Faris, “Creating a Scorecard for the CRA Service Test: Strengthening Banking 
Services	Under	the	Community	Reinvestment	Act”	(Washington,	DC:	Brookings	Institution,	2003),	available	at	http://www.brookings.edu/
papers/2003/01childrenfamilies_stegman.aspx.
6   On retail transactions see Ronald Mann, Charging Ahead: The Growth and Regulation of Payment Card Markets (New York: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2006) p. 10, data as of 2003). On rise of debit cards, see Federal Reserve, 2007 Federal Reserve Payments Study (Washington, 
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75 percent of American households held a credit card, 
and in 2008, nearly $1 trillion in credit card debt was 
outstanding.7 But the advent of credit scoring combined 
with the demise of usury laws has made credit more ex-
pensive than in the past, in both interest and fees. During 
this current crisis, all types of credit have become scarce, 
particularly for those of modest means or with less-than-
pristine credit records. These changes mean that pricing 
and terms are as big a concern as access to credit.
Similar changes have occurred in the mortgage mar-
ket. Until the current mortgage crisis, mortgage origina-
tions and funding had shifted from banks and thrifts to 
origination through broker and correspondent channels, 
often for sale to independent mortgage companies, 
with funding by the capital markets. Although the large 
independent mortgage banks have ceased to exist, and 
mortgage credit in general has dried up, it is unlikely 
that originations will fully move back to retail bank-
ing. The sheer scale of the housing market, even if we 
assume a return to pre-2000 origination levels, suggests 
brokers will continue to play a role, but that all those 
who are part of the mortgage origination chain, includ-
ing brokers, will be required to take some responsibility 
for the performance of the loan. 
Other areas of financial services have also seen major 
changes. The number of Americans who were born 
abroad climbed from approximately 14 million in 1980 
(6.2 percent of the population) to 33.5 million in 2003 
(11.7 percent of the population), creating demand for a 
new financial service: remittances.8 The stock market has 
also seen a surge of new players. Whereas in 1977 few 
Americans invested in financial instruments beyond a 
savings account, as of 2004, one in five American fami-
lies owned stocks and 15 percent owned mutual funds. 
Nearly one-half had retirement accounts.9 These products 
are generally provided by entities other than banks and 
thrifts, including broker-dealers and insurance companies. 
The Growing Ranks of the “Unbanked” 
These broad changes in consumer financial services 
have uniquely affected lower-income Americans. The 
combination of a shrinking cash economy, the con-
solidation of the bank and thrift industries (frequently 
accompanied by fewer branches in minority and lower-
income communities), and the large number of new 
immigrants have generated additional needs and in-
troduced new players to the system. Consumers need 
ways to turn paychecks into cash, send money to native 
countries, and borrow money—ranging from small sums 
for an emergency to home mortgages based on uncon-
ventional income sources or streams. Nonbank financial 
service providers have become ubiquitous in lower-
income communities, including check cashers, whose 
services frequently include remittances, bill pay, and 
small dollar credit; other small-dollar lenders such as 
payday lenders, pawn shops, and auto title lenders; and 
retailers who offer general purpose, reloadable, prepaid 
cards in addition to their own gift cards. Author Howard 
Karger estimates that the United States has more check-
cashing and payday lending outlets than McDonald’s, 
Burger King, Target, Sears, JC Penney, and Wal-Mart 
stores combined.10 
The alternative sector is frequently characterized 
as high-priced and predatory, but it also provides 
products and services that meet the financial services 
needs of a significant swath of the population that 
banks, thrifts, and credit unions are not serving fully.11 
Although the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer 
Finance estimates that as of 2004, about ten percent 
of families lacked a checking account, other surveys 
suggest that the number of individuals without a 
checking or savings account reaches nearly 30 percent 
among lower-income populations.12 As Michael Barr 
noted in his recent study of lower-income consumers 
in Detroit:
7   For data on credit cards, see Brian K. Bucks, Arthur B. Kennickell and Kevin B. Moore, “Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Evidence 
from the 2001 and 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances,” Federal Reserve Bulletin (March 2006), p. A31. For data on outstanding debt, see 
“Federal Reserve Statistical Release G.19” (Washington, DC: Federal Reserve, July 8, 2008).
8   U.S. Census Bureau, “Table 1. Nativity of the Population and Place of Birth of the Native Population: 1850 to 1990” (Washington, DC: Cen-
sus,	March	9,	1999),	available	at	www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0029/tab01.html;	U.S.	Census	Bureau,	The	Foreign-
born Population in the United States: 2003 (Washington, DC: Census, August 2004).
9   Bucks, “Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances” p. A13.
10   Howard Karger, Shortchanged: Life and Debt in the Fringe Economy (San Francisco: Berrett Kohler Publishers, 2005), p. 6.
11   Karger, Shortchanged.
12   Bucks, “Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances,” p. A15. For the other surveys, see, e.g., Ellen Seidman et al., “A Financial Services Survey 
of	Low-	and	Moderate-Income	Households,”	(Chicago,	IL:	Center	for	Financial	Services	Innovation,	2004),	available	at	www.cfsinnovation.
com/research-paper-detail.php?article_id=293;	Barr,	“Financial	Services,	Saving	and	Borrowing.”Revisiting the CRA: Perspectives on the Future of the Community Reinvestment Act
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Though associated with high fees both banked 
and unbanked sample members often describe 
AFS [alternative financial services] transactions as 
convenient. At the same time, bank accounts are 
usually not well structured to serve LMI households. 
Bank fees are quite high, and over half of banked 
LMI households reported paying minimum balance 
or overdraft or insufficient fund fees in the previ-
ous year. The financial services mismatch between 
the needs of LMI households and the products and 
services offered to them largely constrains LMI 
households to choose among high fee, ill-structured 
products offered by banking and AFS institutions.13
The Center for Financial Services Innovation recently 
completed a national study of un- and underbanked 
consumers, a group that includes approximately 40 
million households, or about 36 percent of American 
households.14 This group has a median household 
income of $26,390. Nearly one-half (47 percent) work 
full-time, and 63 percent own their homes. The group is 
60 percent white, 19 percent Hispanic, and 16 percent 
non-Hispanic black. The survey found that nearly one-
half of the group did not have a checking or savings 
account, that is, they were “unbanked,” although about 
one-half of that number had had an account at some 
point in the past. The most frequent reason for not having 
a bank account was not having enough money to make 
one useful. The Detroit study reached similar conclu-
sions, but also noted that three-fourths of the unbanked 
said they would like to open a bank account in the next 
year, and one-third had recently looked into getting a 
bank account.15
A New Paradigm for Responsibility in 
Consumer Financial Services
Both the changing consumer financial services 
landscape in general and the particular problems that 
lower-income consumers face as they attempt to transact 
business (borrow, save, invest, and insure their posses-
sions) strongly suggest that it is time for a new paradigm 
for consumer financial services. To address the substan-
tial and continuing changes in the industry, the country 
needs a proposal just as bold and just as flexible as the 
CRA was 30 years ago. I suggest the following: 
Any financial institution that provides an essential 
consumer product must make that product avail-
able in a fair and transparent manner to low- and 
moderate-income consumers in all communities 
in all broad geographies in which the entity does 
more than an incidental amount of business in the 
product.16
Fairness and Transparency
Fairness and transparency are central principles 
in the financial services sector. But these principles 
often apply differently to low- and moderate-income 
consumers. The reasons for these different applications 
include a smaller margin for error and lack of capital on 
which to base a recovery when something goes wrong; 
generally lower education levels among participants; 
less access to quality and timely financial advice; and, 
particularly in the last 15 years, a younger population 
often with limited experience with the American 
financial system. 
13   Barr, “Financial Services, Saving and Borrowing” p. 3.
14	 	Center	for	Financial	Services	Innovation,	“The	CFSI	Underbanked	Consumer	Study,	Underbanked	Consumer	Overview	andMarket	Seg-
ments.”	Fact	Sheet.	(Chicago,	IL:	CFSI,	June	8,	2008),	available	at	www.cfsinnovation.com/research-paper-detail.php?article_id=330366.	




investment banks and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. However, the responsibilities institutions have in directly serving consumers should carry 
through to their investment activities. See Letter from Edward B. Kramer, Deputy Superintendent of Banks, State of New York Banking Depart-
ment,	“Due	Diligence	Recommendations	Concerning	the	Eligibility	of	Loan	Purchases	and	Investments	for	Consideration	Under	the	Commu-
nity	Reinvestment	Act,”	July	26,	2001,	available	at	http://www.banking.state.ny.us/lt010726.htm.	In	addition,	these	institutions	might	well	be	
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In this context, fair then means that an entity provid-
ing essential consumer financial services to the general 
public, directly or through agents, must abide by the 
following principles:
•  Essential financial services must meet the needs 
and desires of low- and moderate-income consum-
ers, with sufficient market research to accurately 
assess those needs;
•  Essential financial services must be offered at equi-
table prices and terms, on the basis of cost and an 
accurate assessment of risk;
•  Analysis of potential profitability over time, need 
for capital, and other investment criteria must be 
done on a basis that is no less favorable for service 
to low- and moderate-income consumers than it is 
for wealthier consumers.
For example, if a bank offers overdraft protection 
based on a line of credit or a tie to a savings account to 
customers who open checking accounts in branches in 
suburban neighborhoods, it would also be required to 
investigate whether consumers in lower income commu-
nities would prefer this type of protection to a fee-based 
overdraft program. It would then analyze the potential 
profitability of such programs in both types of communi-
ties on an equal basis (e.g., if profitability is analyzed on 
a product rather than customer basis in one place, the 
same type of analysis should be used in the other), and 
offer (or decline to offer) the product in both places at 
prices that accurately reflect cost and risk on a similarly 
individualized basis. 
Transparency has two essential dimensions, one for 
consumers and one for the public:
•  Firms must provide actual and potential custom-
ers with quality service and accurate information 
about the terms of products, delivered in a timely 
and understandable fashion, including realistic 
information about risks;
•  Firms must provide the public (or if information 
is proprietary, a government intermediary) with 
information on how the firm provides essential 
consumer financial services; and that information 
must be available in a manner and with sufficient 
quality, quantity, and timeliness to allow persons 
outside the firm to accurately assess the extent to 
which a firm meets its obligations, both during the 
current period and over time. 
Taken together, these two concepts would require 
better and more accurate disclosure to consumers about 
product terms and risks—the one-page mortgage disclo-
sure document suggested by Alex Pollock of the Ameri-
can Enterprise Institute is an example17—and the exten-
sion of HMDA reporting to other products such as credit 
cards and small consumer loans.
This paradigm thus focuses on the effective develop-
ment, marketing, and distribution of well-designed and 
understandable consumer products and services, and it 
imposes a requirement of equity across communities and 
consumers of all types. It concentrates the attention of 
business, the public, and government on what is impor-
tant to consumers, and uses the market forces generated 
by consumers with the knowledge and resources to de-
mand high-quality financial services to extend the reach 
of those products and services to the rest of the market.
Products and Services Subject to the New 
Responsibility Paradigm
The extent of coverage of products under this new 
paradigm is an important consideration. It is critical 
not to pull back on current coverage of the CRA. At the 
same time, it is also clear that not all products, services, 
or financial institutions should be covered by CRA-style 
regulation. To take an extreme example, it is neither 
necessary nor an appropriate use of scarce enforcement 
resources to ensure that hedge fund investment opportu-
nities be available to low- and moderate-income con-
sumers. However, coverage should not be excessively 
limited, or too tied to current economic conditions and 
financial structures and opportunities.
A useful way to think about products and services 
that should be covered by the CRA is to focus on those 
financial products and services that are essential to full 
and active participation in the American middle class. 
These include products and services to meet transaction-
al, credit, saving and investment, and insurance needs. 
Products and services should be considered “essential” 
17	 	See	Alex	Pollock,	“The	Basic	Facts	About	Your	Mortgage	Loan,”	(Washington,	DC:	American	Enterprise	Institute,	2007),	available	at	http://
www.aei.org/docLib/20070913_20070515_PollockPrototype.pdf.Revisiting the CRA: Perspectives on the Future of the Community Reinvestment Act
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only if the public broadly uses them. Although the items 
included will likely change over time, by defining them 
in terms of functionality rather than specific products, 
we reduce the need for additions or subtractions.
Transactions
With respect to transactions, the ongoing, revolution-
ary changes occurring with prepaid cards and the likeli-
hood of major breakthroughs in using mobile phones for 
financial services call for a functional approach.18 Essen-
tial functionalities are converting sources of revenue (par-
ticularly paychecks and benefits of all sorts) into useable 
means of payment; and a means of making timely and 
secure payments and transfers to savings or investment. 
Credit
For credit, “essential” may be defined in terms of 
likely future credit needs. This, of course, was the area 
of initial concern under the CRA, and it continues to 
be critical in providing the leverage for major wealth-
building investments such as a home or higher education 
and to smooth income fluctuations. Thus, essential credit 
products include short-term credit, whether secured or 
unsecured, for small amounts; auto credit; mortgage 
credit, and credit for postsecondary education.
Savings and Investments
Saving and investment were not part of the initial 
CRA focus, in part because the CRA at the time sought 
to address the problem that financial institutions in 
lower-income communities did not reinvest low-income 
individuals’ savings in their communities. Today, the 
problem is not so much reinvestment of savings as spur-
ring savings in the first place. It is clear, given the current 
debt-led economic troubles and low national personal 
savings rate, that Americans need to save more money. 
In 1977, individual access to investment opportuni-
ties was limited, but there was less need for such op-
portunities because defined-benefit retirement plans, in 
which the employer took responsibility for investment 
decisions and outcomes, were much more common. This 
has since changed. The new paradigm should therefore 
cover: (a) non purpose-limited, short-term savings oppor-
tunities; (b) longer-term, low-risk saving and investment 
opportunities (e.g., insured accounts, CDs, and Treasury 
obligations including savings bonds); and (c) investment 
opportunities such as retirement accounts and tax-ad-
vantaged Section 529 education savings plans.
Insurance
Insurance is also an essential product. In most states, 
drivers must be insured, and mortgage creditors demand 
homeowner’s insurance. Both types of insurance are 
important to protecting these assets. It is therefore critical 
to include automobile and homeowner’s insurance in 
the new responsibility and accountability regime. Medi-
cal insurance, including long-term care coverage, is also 
highly desirable; a significant share of bankruptcies is 
caused by uninsured medical expenses. However, this is 
an issue that goes far beyond the financial services sec-
tor and requires a much broader solution. 
How These Principles Relate to Current 
CRA Enforcement and Interpretation
To bring the CRA more fully in line with both the 
modern financial services system and the principles and 
scope proposed, some changes are needed. The most 
important are the following:
•  The CRA should cover service to low- and mod-
erate-income consumers in providing an essential 
product everywhere a bank or thrift does a sig-
nificant amount of business in any of the essential 
products. If a firm operates nationally, it should 
be evaluated on how well it serves low- and 
moderate-income consumers nationwide with the 
type of product it is offering nationally. Thus, CRA 
coverage with respect to mortgage loans should 
depend on where the firm makes such loans, not 
where it has deposit-taking branches, as is cur-
rently the case.
•  Effective public disclosure should be added that 
covers additional essential products, including the 
essential transaction and savings products used 
by low- and moderate-income consumers. Thus, 
HMDA should be extended to other essential con-
sumer products.
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•  Any for-profit subsidiary or holding company af-
filiate that provides any of the essential products 
should be evaluated in the same manner and at 
the same time as the largest bank or thrift in the 
holding company group. This would overcome the 
current situation in which lower quality prod-
ucts offered by a bank or thrift holding company 
through a subsidiary escape evaluation because 
they are offered outside of the bank or thrift.
•  Consumer protection and fair lending responsi-
bilities must be more firmly embedded in CRA 
evaluations. This would extend the 2005 regulatory 
revisions that mandate, when evaluating lending 
activities, that evaluators assess compliance with 
the fair lending and consumer protection laws 
and regulations to cover transactional, saving, and 
investment offerings.19 The quality of products, 
especially credit products, must be considered in 
addition to the penetration of such products into all 
communities.
•  Incentives should be established that are external 
to the CRA, potentially including reduced insur-
ance premiums for outstanding performance; as the 
current troubles in the market remind us, treating 
consumers well is good for business over the long 
term. To stimulate better performance and limit 
grade inflation, the number of Outstanding ratings 
should be limited, perhaps to a slowly increasing 
percentage above current levels.
Extending the Paradigm to Other 
Essential Functions
Some commentators assert that the CRA, with its 
requirement that banks and thrifts fully serve all commu-
nities in their assessment areas, is to blame for the cur-
rent financial crisis.20 There are many reasons to doubt 
such claims, including timing (CRA was passed and the 
regulations strengthened long before serious problems 
arose), the generally higher quality of mortgages made 
by depository institutions in their assessment areas, and 
the fact that the worst excesses have occurred as CRA 
enforcement diminished in the past eight years.21 How-
ever, the most convincing reason not to lay the blame 
on the CRA is the high proportion of high-priced loans 
that were made by entities not subject to the CRA.22 
The problem, of course, was that these other institutions 
were also exempt from the level of consumer protection 
to which banks and thrifts were subject, and they discov-
ered that lending with fewer limitations to individuals in 
lower-income communities was highly profitable.23
This problem of unequal regulation and enforcement 
raises a need for some caution with respect to extending 
the CRA beyond banks and thrifts, particularly for credit 
products. Although the Federal Reserve and Congress 
have reduced the regulatory disparity in mortgage 
lending, enforcement disparities will continue and 
other types of credit are still under highly variable 




21   See Randall Kroszner, “The Community Reinvestment Act and the Recent Mortgage Crisis” (Washington, DC: Federal Reserve Board, Decem-
ber	3,	2008),	available	at	http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/kroszner20081203a.htm.	For	evidence	of	high-quality	mortgages,	
see See Traiger and Hinckley LLP, “The Community Reinvestment Act: A Welcome Anomaly in the Foreclosure Crisis” (New York, NY:Traiger 
and	Hinckley,	LLP,	January	7,	2008)	available	at	www.traigerlaw.com/publications/traiger_hinckley_llp_cra_foreclosure_study_1-7-08.pdf;	




Gets Nasty When it Targets the Poor,” Washington Post, October 12, 2008, p. F1.
22   Robert Avery, Kenneth Brevoort, and Glenn Canner, “The 2006 HMDA Data,” Federal Reserve Bulletin (December 2007), p. A89.
23   See Edward Gramlich, “Booms and Busts, The Case of Subprime Mortgages” (Jackson Hole, WY: Federal Reserve Board, August 31, 2007), 
available	at	www.kc.frb.org/publicat/sympos/2007/pdf/2007.09.04.gramlich.pdf.
24	 	For	efforts	by	the	Federal	Reserve,	see	73	Fed.	Reg.	44522	(July	30,	2008).	For	congressional	efforts,	see	Public	Law	110-289	(July	30,	2008).Revisiting the CRA: Perspectives on the Future of the Community Reinvestment Act
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entirely prohibited in several states (e.g., New York, 
North Carolina, and Maryland), subject to relatively tight 
usury caps in others (Ohio and Arkansas), allowed with 
other types of regulatory protections in others (Illinois), 
and allowed without significant limitation in still others 
(California). As we think about extending the CRA, it 
will be important to coordinate its service requirement 
with an acceptable minimum standard of consumer 
protection.25 
One way to extend the CRA to other types of fi-
nancial institutions is to replicate the statute, assign-
ing responsibility for examination and enforcement to 
regulators (to the extent the firms involved are subject to 
regulatory supervision), or to surrogates such as the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development. For 
credit unions, which are regulated similarly to banks and 
thrifts (and also the beneficiaries of federal insurance), 
such extension would seem appropriate, perhaps modi-
fying the credit unions’ statutory service obligation to 
take into account enhanced responsibilities under a new 
regime. However, for other types of financial services, 
operating under different types of (or no) supervisory 
regimes, alternative solutions are likely required. These 
solutions should take maximum advantage of existing 
regulatory systems and responsibilities with the aim of 
achieving equity in result, rather than complete consis-
tency in regulatory methodology.
Enhanced Public Reporting 
A first step should be to ensure that any requirement 
for public reporting and dissemination of informa-
tion about credit extends beyond residential lending to 
include all creditors who extend similar types of credit.26 
As HMDA has demonstrated, the obligation to report 
can be effectively extended to institutions outside federal 
regulatory jurisdiction when uniform reporting require-
ments are in effect, when government-supplied software 
is available, and when a single entity (in the case of 
HMDA, the Federal Reserve) is responsible for cleaning 
data, making it public, and doing the initial analysis. 
Although the Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment is the initial recipient of mortgage data under 
HMDA, information about other types of credit could 
be provided initially to state regulators or directly to the 
Federal Reserve. 
Similarly, public reporting on noncredit services 
should be tailored to the type of service and should 
include all those providing such services as a significant 
part of their business. For example, to ensure banks, 
thrifts, or credit unions are meeting service obligations, 
the primary focus might be the incomes of checking and 
savings account holders. For insurance companies, the 
information might relate to the characteristics of holders 
of defined types of policies. Because this information 
would be industry-specific, it should be gathered and 
disseminated by industry-specific regulators where such 
exist, under standards developed in coordination with 
bank regulators. As with credit information, other types 
of financial services providers could provide information 
directly to the Federal Reserve.
Increased Regulatory Reach and Enforcement
Public dissemination of information serves to inform 
the public and expand the likelihood that those provid-
ers who are offering quality products will have a com-
petitive advantage with consumers. However, to ensure 
that providers are meeting their obligations to serve fairly 
consumers who may not be able or inclined to take ad-
vantage of such data, public dissemination of data must 
be accompanied by a regulatory regime that evaluates 
compliance and imposes consequences, both directly on 
the company and indirectly by increasing public aware-
ness of how an institution is behaving. This aspect is the 
most difficult part. We cannot expect other regulatory 
regimes to adopt wholesale the bank regulatory model, 
and it is unlikely that would even be desirable. 
Instead, the principles of the responsibility paradigm 
should be added to various regulatory regimes in a 
manner that is consistent with the scope and intent of 
the particular regime, and that is consistent with and 
builds on existing and improved consumer-oriented 
obligations and protections. For state-regulated entities, 
the appropriate mechanism is likely national legislation 
establishing principles, a regulatory floor, and a back-up 
regulatory regime should states not adopt the regulatory 
minimum.27 
25   For a suggestion for how to accomplish this, see Elizabeth Warren, “Unsafe at Any Rate,” Democracy (Summer 2007), available at www.democracy-
journal.org/article.php?ID=6528.	Warren	proposes	a	Financial	Product	Safety	Commission	modeled	on	the	Consumer	Product	Safety	Commission.
26	 	This	suggestion	is	already	getting	some	traction.	See	“Democrats	Eyeing	HMDA-Like	Rules	for	Nonmortgages,”	American	Banker,	July	18,	2008.
27   This is similar to the scheme adopted for regulation of mortgage brokers in the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008. See Title V, Pub. 
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Integrating the paradigm’s principles consistently into 
disparate regulatory regimes will require consultation 
and collaboration at both the state and federal levels. 
Moreover, for financial services not currently subject to 
any federal supervision and limited state regulation, it is 
appropriate to consider a combination of enhanced state 
regulatory authority (and funding), increased responsibil-
ity and funding for the Federal Trade Commission, and/
or new statutory responsibilities at the state and federal 
levels, with private rights of action to enforce them.
Considering Broad-Based Product Specifications
Consumer protections have, in general, focused on 
limiting product terms, including price, marketing, and 
advertising. Recently, some have proposed an alterna-
tive: requirements that products meeting certain criteria 
be offered first, or that products be limited to those that 
meet standard terms, with competition permitted only 
on, for example, price. With respect to mortgages, for 
example, several behavioral economists have suggested 
that all home buyers be first offered a 30-year fixed-rate 
mortgage, and that lenders provide clear disclosure if 
borrowers turn down the “default” mortgage; lack of 
reasonable disclosure would be a defense to bankruptcy 
or foreclosure if an alternative loan turns bad.28 Ron-
ald Mann has suggested that credit card contract terms 
be standardized, limiting competition to a small set of 
clearly identified and relatively easy-to-comprehend 
terms, such as the interest rate and level of various fees.29
In the realm of transaction accounts and on a more 
limited basis, Michael Barr has suggested a model 
“starter” account accessible only by debit card, with no 
overdrafts permitted and with no minimum balance re-
quirement.30 And states require preapproval of consumer 
insurance products, although as the post-Katrina experi-
ence in New Orleans has demonstrated, this does not 
eliminate controversy surrounding underwriting, pricing, 
or the effectiveness of coverage.31
It is worth exploring whether developing a limited 
number of preferred or default products for the popula-
tion in general, or developing a more limited subset 
targeted by a new CRA obligation, could systematically 
improve the outcomes for consumers of a broadly ap-
plied obligation to serve. Such a product set, if accom-
panied by a safe harbor protection for providers, might 
also reduce the uncertainty in a requirement for “fair and 
equitable” treatment of consumers.
Prioritizing and Sequencing
Even considered in the context of existing regulatory 
regimes, adopting in full a new responsibility paradigm 
is a major undertaking. It is, however, possible to stage 
adoption. One possibility is to begin with the products 
most likely to create major problems for consumers, and 
the entities that sell those products. The current situation 
in the credit markets suggests that credit products should 
be first on the agenda, followed perhaps by investment 
products. A second scheme would be to stage imple-
mentation based on the lack of availability or account-
ability for essential products. In this scheme, an initial 
focus could be on transaction products, where federally 
regulated depositories are not effectively serving all 
Americans and alternative providers are subject to little 
scrutiny and public accountability. A third alternative 
would be to begin where existing statutory and regulatory 
schemes are most developed and where implementation 
of the agenda’s principles would require relatively mod-
est changes. This suggests that, beyond banks and thrifts, 
credit unions should be first, followed by insurance com-
panies and their agents, and then securities brokers. 
Each alternative has benefits and drawbacks. For ex-
ample, moving first on credit products might generate the 
most benefit for consumers, but it would require develop-







nity NYC account that New York City has arranged at a small number of banks and credit unions to hold the proceeds of its conditional cash 
transfer	program.	See	http://home2.nyc.gov/html/ceo/downloads/pdf/report_opportunity_nyc.pdf.
31	 	See	Daniel	Schwarcz,	“Towards	a	New	Approach	for	Resolving	Consumer	Insurance	Disputes.”	Working	paper	(Ann	Arbor,	MI:	Social	Sci-
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enforcement regimes for entities not currently subject to 
federal supervision. On the other hand, starting by ex-
panding CRA-like obligations to credit unions but ignor-
ing payday lenders, finance companies and independent 
mortgage bankers would have the virtue of relative sim-
plicity but would exacerbate the competitive inequality 
in the current regulatory system. But the alternatives also 
suggest ways to improve, in measured increments, the 
essential financial products and services consumers need, 
and the manner in which those services are delivered.
 
Conclusion
Thirty years ago, numerous American cities were dy-
ing for lack of credit. By enacting the CRA, the federal 
government challenged the banking industry to help 
those communities and their residents achieve a better 
life. Together with related statutes such as HMDA and 
antidiscrimination and consumer protection laws, the 
CRA has had a substantial, positive impact in bringing 
credit and other financial services to low- and moderate-
income consumers and communities. 
The 30 years since the CRA’s adoption have seen 
massive changes in the number, complexity, and types of 
financial products consumers use, how they are mar-
keted and accessed, and who provides them. Simul-
taneously, the increase in homeownership, workforce 
restructuring, and the decline in employer-provided 
retirement and health benefits require consumers to take 
much greater responsibility for their financial health and 
stability. Many Americans are not doing well in meeting 
this new responsibility. The mortgage and credit markets 
are in turmoil with extraordinarily high and rising levels 
of foreclosures, the personal savings rate is extremely 
low, bankruptcies are at record levels, and debt burdens 
are overwhelming many families. The new responsibility 
paradigm presented here challenges the entire financial 
services industry—as the CRA did 30 years ago—to help 
American consumers do better. 
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